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ABSTRACT 
 
The First Amendment protects not only our right to 
share ideas, but also to some extent, our right to choose the 
specific method by which we share them. Generally 
speaking, these protections apply to inmates’ rights to 
communicate with those outside of prison. However, the 
protection of those rights must be balanced with the 
penological interests of prisons and jails. Electronic 
messaging has now become a standard form of 
communication within most American homes and 
businesses. Accordingly, the Federal Bureau of Prisons has 
implemented the TRULINCS program, a program which 
allows inmates to communicate with those outside of prison 
through electronic messaging. The Washington State 
Department of Corrections has installed JPay kiosks in 
state-operated facilities that allow inmates to send and 
receive electronic messages. However, most state prison 
systems and county jails currently do not offer inmates the 
option of receiving or sending electronic messages. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that 
prisoners have a constitutional right to send and receive 
mail, and some circuit courts have extended that right to 
telephone use. This Article examines the foundational 
aspects of free speech in prison settings and how the 
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evolution of communication might affect the breadth of an 
inmate’s free speech rights. This Article argues that, in 
certain situations, the First Amendment should protect 
inmates’ interests in sending and receiving emails. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Times have changed drastically since Tom Hanks and Meg 
Ryan sat anxiously at their computers awaiting that famously 
infectious chime, “You’ve got mail.” Email has since developed 
into an everyday staple of communication. On average, 182.9 
billion emails are sent worldwide every day.1 In 2013, the number 
of email accounts existing was approximately 3.9 billion.2 That 
number is expected to rise to 4.9 billion by the end of 2017.3 
Despite the prolific use of email in everyday communications, 
email has only recently started being used in prisons. It was not 
until 2006 that prisoners in eleven federal facilities gained access 
to a limited electronic messaging service through the Trust Fund 
Limited Inmate Communication System pilot program.4 By early 
2009, the system was accessible in over thirty federal prisons5 and 
was renamed the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System 
(“TRULINCS”)6. Today, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) 
can boast that all BOP operated facilities enjoy access to electronic 
messaging through TRULINCS.7 
While electronic messaging remains unavailable to almost all 
prisoners in state and county custody, a small number of state 
prison systems have begun to provide electronic messaging 
                                                                                                             
1 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
2 THE RADICATI GROUP, EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT 2013–2017 —
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (Sara Radicati ed., 2013), http://www.radicati.com/wp/ 
wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Email-Statistics-Report-2013-2017-Executive-
Summary.pdf. 
3 Id. 
4 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS 
REPORT NO. I-2006-009, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ MONITORING OF MAIL 
FOR HIGH-RISK INMATES app. IV (2006). 
5 Douglas Galbi, Email for Prisoners Highly Successful, PURPLE MOTES 
(Sept. 11, 2011), http://purplemotes.net/2011/09/11/email-for-prisoners-highly-
successful/. 
6 FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM 
STATEMENT NO. P5265.13, TRUST FUND LIMITED INMATE COMPUTER SYSTEM 
(TRULINCS) - ELECTRONIC MESSAGING (2009). 
7 TRULINCS Topics, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/ 
inmates/trulincs.jsp (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
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systems to inmates. For instance, the Washington Department of 
Corrections (“WDOC”) has become the only prison system in the 
Ninth Circuit to provide incoming and outgoing email services to 
inmates by partnering with a service called “JPay” and installing 
commercial email kiosks in most WDOC operated facilities.8 
Likewise, the Michigan State Department of Corrections has 
installed JPay kiosks in all of its facilities.9 Apart from Washington 
and Michigan, a total of five other state prison systems provide 
email access to inmates in at least some of their facilities—
Virginia,10 Louisiana,11 North Dakota,12 Ohio,13 and Maryland.14 
Some facilities in the Washington, Louisiana, North Dakota, and 
Virginia prisons systems have even implemented special tablets 
with limited functions to make email services more accessible to 
inmates.15 
Whether in federal or state prison, email access comes to 
prisoners at a price. To send and receive messages through 
                                                                                                             
8 JPay Communication System (Email), WASH. STATE DEP’T OF CORR., 
http://www.doc.wa.gov/family/jpay.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
9 Electronic Messages – Sending to Prisoners, MICH. DEP’T OF 
CORRECTIONS, http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,4551,7-119-68854_ 
68856_63694-201925--,00.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
10 Virginia Department of Corrections, JPAY, http://www.jpay.com/ 
Agency-Details/Virginia-Department-of-Corrections.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 
2015). 
11 Louisiana Department of Corrections, JPAY, http://www.jpay.com/ 
Agency-Details/Louisiana-Department-of-Corrections.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 
2015). 
12 North Dakota State Penitentiary, JPAY, http://www.jpay.com/ 
Facility-Details/North-Dakota-Department-of-Corrections/North-Dakota-State-
Penitentiary.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
13 Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, JPAY, 
http://www.jpay.com/Agency-Details/Ohio-Department-of-Rehabilitation-and-
Correction.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
14 Maryland Correctional Institution – Women, MD. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY 
& CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/locations/ 
mciw.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). It should be noted that Maryland is 
implementing electronic messaging on a trial basis, and only in one women’s 
correctional facility. 
15 Mini-tablet for Prisons Now Available in Louisiana, Virginia, 
Washington and N. Dakota!, JPAY BLOG, http://blog.jpay.com/mini-tablet-for-
prisons-now-available-in-louisiana-and-virginia/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
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TRULINCS, JPay, or some other state implemented service, 
inmates and their loved ones must pay between seventeen and sixty 
cents per email.16 As the BOP states: “No taxpayer dollars are used 
for this service. Funding is provided entirely by the Inmate Trust 
Fund, which is maintained by profits from inmate purchases of 
commissary products, telephone services, and the fees inmates pay 
for using TRULINCS.”17 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law  
. . . abridging the freedom of speech.”18 This prohibition applies 
equally to the several states that have incorporated this system 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.19 In an 
era when technology has significantly increased the channels of 
communication available to the public, changing times have forced 
courts to evaluate the First Amendment guarantee of free speech in 
increasingly complex scenarios. This Article examines the 
intersection of free speech protections and access to electronic 
messaging in prison. 
 
I. EMAIL AND THE FREE SPEECH FRAMEWORK 
 
To understand how free speech protections interact with an 
inmate’s access to electronic messaging systems, it is necessary to 
recognize (1) how the First Amendment might interact with email 
communications and (2) what level of scrutiny applies to various 
restrictions on free speech rights. 
 
A.  Applying the First Amendment to Email Communications 
 
Internet communications, such as emails, presumptively fall 
within the ambit of free speech protections.20 In assessing an 
                                                                                                             
16 Derek Gilna, Prison Systems Increasingly Provide Email - For a Price, 
PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 2015, at 35. 
17 TRULINCS Topics, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/ 
inmates/trulincs.jsp (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
18 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 
U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (incorporating the First Amendment’s free speech clause 
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause). 
20 See Clement v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 364 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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alleged violation of free speech, the initial consideration regarding 
any claim is whether a limitation implicates any free speech rights. 
These rights are not limited by form. Courts have found that 
Internet communications deserve the same protections as other 
more traditional forms of speech.21 
Generally, communication enjoys a presumptive implication of 
First Amendment protection.22 As iterated by the Supreme Court, 
“[m]ost of what we say to one another lacks religious, political, 
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value (let 
alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from government 
regulation.”23 As such, when government action limits the 
communicative use of words, free speech protections are 
implicated. 
In the context of Internet communications, courts have 
determined that the First Amendment “protects material 
disseminated over the internet as well as by the means of 
communication devices used prior to the high-tech era.”24 
Accordingly, attempts to communicate over the Internet, which 
incorporate linguistic elements,25 such as most emails, 
presumptively fall within the First Amendment’s scope; the 
presumption is rebuttable only if there is an established tradition of 
exclusion.26 
                                                                                                             
21 See id.; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). 
22 See Charles W. Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and 
Speech, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 395, 404 (2014). 
23 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 479 (2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
24 Clement, 364 F.3d at 1151; see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 868. 
25 See Rhodes, supra note 22 (“The use of words or language to attempt to 
communicate any assertion, idea, perception, emotion, or thought—or any 
attempt to receive such words or language—is presumptively covered by the 
First Amendment.”). 
26 See Rhodes, supra note 22. See this article for a discussion of the types of 
exclusions that are common or may apply to free speech rights. Although many 
communications that are sent via the Internet could trigger such exclusions, they 
are irrelevant to the more general discussion of email access in a prison setting. 
Because such a discussion focuses on the initial ability to access email rather 
than the content of a particular inmate’s communications, there is no context 
here in which to address these exclusions. 
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B.  Applying the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny to Restrictions on 
Free Speech 
 
Once a government action has been shown to implicate free 
speech protections, the inquiry becomes whether the action 
imposes restrictions that are “content-neutral.” A regulation is 
content-neutral if its applicability to a given expression does not 
turn on the content of the speech.27 Here, “[t]he government’s 
purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves 
purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral . 
. . . ”28 In contrast, “[r]ules are generally considered content-based 
when the regulating party must examine the speech to determine if 
it is acceptable.”29 
If the action is not content-neutral, then the action will be 
examined under strict scrutiny, which means it violates the First 
Amendment unless shown to be “the least restrictive means of 
achieving a compelling state interest.”30 However, if the action is 
content-neutral, then it is subject to intermediate scrutiny, which 
means that the court will determine if the action is “narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and . . . 
leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.”31 The application of intermediate scrutiny in the 
context of content-neutral governmental action is based on the 
premise that “the government may impose reasonable restrictions 
on the time, place, or manner of protected speech.”32 
Although the government may create reasonable time, place, or 
                                                                                                             
27 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790–91 (1989). 
28 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
29 United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Local 586 v. NLRB, 540 
F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (“[R]estrictions of 
this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.”). 
30 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014). 
31 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
32 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
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manner restrictions in public forums,33 the foreclosure of an entire 
avenue of speech should be subject to strict scrutiny. The Ninth 
Circuit has recognized that, in addition to the right to communicate 
the content of a message, “free speech protections extend to the 
‘right to choose a particular means or avenue of speech . . . in lieu 
of other avenues.’”34 Accordingly, the “[g]overnment may regulate 
the manner of speech in a content-neutral way but may not infringe 
on an individual’s right to select the means of speech.”35 The total 
foreclosure of an avenue of speech, even while alternative avenues 
remain open, acts as the total abrogation of a protected 
constitutional right. 
For example, in Meyer v. Grant,36 the Supreme Court 
determined that a prohibition on paid petition circulators violated 
the First Amendment when it foreclosed the opportunity for the 
petitioner to communicate its message through the “most effective, 
fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political 
discourse, direct one-on-one communication.”37 Specifically, the 
Court held that such actions by the government “involved a 
limitation on . . . expression subject to exacting scrutiny.”38 
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court concluded that the government 
action violated the First Amendment, even though multiple other 
avenues of expression remained open to the petitioner.39 In 
reaching its conclusion, the Court determined that the First 
Amendment protects not only the right to communicate a message, 
“but also to select what [one] believe[s] to be the most effective 
means for so doing.”40 This protection of the First Amendment 
may be applicable to the selection of email services to convey 
protected communications, especially when email has become such 
an efficient, fundamental, and economically advantageous avenue 
of discourse. 
                                                                                                             
33 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
34 United Bhd. of Carpenters, 540 F.3d at 969 (quoting Foti v. City of 
Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 641 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
35 Foti, 146 F.3d at 641–42. 
36 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). 
37 Id. at 424. 
38 Id. at 420. 
39 Id. at 424. 
40 Id. 
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II. THE FREE SPEECH FRAMEWORK IN A PRISON CONTEXT 
 
Prisons and jails can be dangerous places, and some of the 
people inside can pose a serious threat to other prisoners and the 
outside world if their communications are not limited. 
Accordingly, to protect both the public and prisoners alike, free 
speech protections must be analyzed with greater caution in a 
prison context. Understanding how free speech protections might 
work in a prison setting requires examining: (1) the general 
principles behind the constitutional rights of prisoners, (2) the 
historical framework for free speech challenges in prison settings, 
and (3) the government’s traditionally limited power to regulate 
time, place, or manner of free speech. 
 
A.  Guiding Principles Regarding Constitutional Rights of 
Prisoners 
 
The analysis of the constitutional rights of prisoners is guided 
primarily by two often-conflicting principles: an inmate’s retention 
of constitutional rights, and deference to prison authorities. When 
these two principles come into tension, courts must balance the 
“traditional policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner 
complaints and the need to protect constitutional rights.”41 
Incarceration does not deprive inmates of their constitutional 
rights and protections. The Court in Turner v. Safley exemplifies 
this principle, stating that “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier 
separating prison inmates from the protections of the 
Constitution.”42 This principle applies wherever a prisoner in 
government custody asserts constitutional protections.43 
However, in the context of prison administration, courts should 
                                                                                                             
41 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 (1974), abrogated by 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
42 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 
43 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (applying due 
process protections); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485–86 (1969) 
(protecting the right to petition the government); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 
333, 333 (1968) (applying Equal Protection Clause). 
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“accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”44 Because 
the expertise, planning, and commitment of resources involved 
with running a prison fall “peculiarly within the province of the 
legislative and executive branches of government,” separation of 
power concerns support a policy of judicial restraint on questions 
that would affect these issues.45 
It is easy to see how deference to prison administrators might 
conflict with an inmate’s assertion of his or her retained 
constitutional protections. These principles are supposed to be 
“balanced” against the other when they conflict. However, the 
analysis in Turner suggests that the Court favors deference to 
prison authorities. 
 
B.  The Framework for Free Speech Challenges in Prison 
 
Separate standards govern the evaluation of incoming and 
outgoing correspondence restrictions. The historical framework of 
free speech challenges in a prison context suggests that 
“heightened scrutiny” will be applied to restrictions on outgoing 
communications while a more deferential “reasonableness test” 
will be applied to limitations on incoming communications. 
The Supreme Court’s first major articulation of a standard of 
review for prison regulations on free speech occurred in Procunier 
v. Martinez.46 The Court required that such regulations “further an 
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the 
suppression of expression” and do not impinge on First 
Amendment protections more “than is necessary or essential to the 
protection of the particular governmental interest involved.”47 
Although this test largely mirrors the effective language of a 
heightened—or even strict—scrutiny standard, subsequent cases 
obscured this standard and it devolved into a vague test based on 
the “reasonableness” of prison regulations.48 
                                                                                                             
44 Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. 
45 Id. 
46 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
47 Id. at 413. 
48 See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 550 (1979); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 
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Thirteen years after its decision in Martinez, the Court in 
Turner explicitly set forth a “reasonableness” standard for 
evaluating prison regulations that dealt with incoming 
correspondence.49 There, the Court stated that prison regulations 
are “valid if [they are] reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.”50 To evaluate the reasonableness of a regulation, the 
Court provided four factors to consider: 
(1) [W]hether the regulation is rationally related to a 
legitimate and neutral governmental objective, (2) 
whether there are alternative avenues that remain 
open . . . to exercise the right, (3) the impact that 
accommodating the asserted right will have on other 
guards and prisoners, and on the allocation of prison 
resources; and (4) whether the existence of easy and 
obvious alternatives indicates that the regulation is 
an exaggerated response by prison officials.51 
Two years later, in Thornburgh v. Abbott,52 after recognizing 
that the “implications of outgoing correspondence for prison 
security are of a categorically lesser magnitude than the 
implications of incoming materials,”53 the Court clarified that the 
reasonableness standard applied subsequent to Martinez, and 
articulated in Turner, applied specifically to incoming 
correspondence. Pursuant to this conclusion, the Court explicitly 
overruled the standard of Martinez as it only applies to incoming 
correspondence. However, while the more deferential standard of 
Turner applies to incoming correspondence, it appears that the 
heightened scrutiny standard of Martinez remains in force for 
outgoing correspondence. Accordingly, it appears that separate 
standards govern the evaluation of incoming and outgoing 
correspondence restrictions: the Martinez heightened scrutiny test 
                                                                                                             
131 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 
49 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
50 Id. at 89. 
51 Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). 
52 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
53 Id. at 413. 
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for outgoing communications and the Turner reasonableness test 
for incoming communications. 
Although “[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary . . . 
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by 
the considerations underlying our penal system,”54 neither the 
Martinez nor the Turner standard turn on an individual’s status as 
an inmate. The only policy consideration supporting a lower 
standard of scrutiny for communications inside and outside of 
prisons is the deference that is due to the executive officers 
responsible for prison management. The evaluation of a prison 
regulation that implicates free speech rights is logically connected 
to the legitimate or substantial security concerns of running a 
prison, not a lessened value imputed to the constitutional rights of 
inmates. It is thus irrelevant whether the regulations implicate the 
free speech protections of inmates or of the free citizens who seek 
to communicate with them. 
 
C.   What Happened to the Limited Power to Regulate Time, Place, 
or Manner? 
 
While the Turner standard attempts to balance conflicting 
policies by applying a “reasonableness” standard to prison 
regulations, it fails to account for the government’s limited power 
to regulate the time, place, or manner of free speech.55 
Many prison practices may designate limitations on speech 
such as the number of correspondences sent and received each day, 
the volume of single messages, or the manner of packaging written 
communications. These types of limitations would fall squarely 
within the power of the government to reasonably limit the time, 
place, or manner of speech. However, in establishing the Turner 
standard, the Court failed to account for government actions that 
go beyond the mere regulation of time, place, or manner. In doing 
so, it overlooked longstanding checks on the power to regulate 
                                                                                                             
54 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
55 See “Applying the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny to Restrictions on Free 
Speech,” supra at p. 7. 
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speech and instituted a standard that evaluates the reasonableness 
of abrogating a constitutional right by deferring to the executive 
authority of local prison administrators. 
This viewpoint overlooks the risk of restrictions that go beyond 
the government’s traditional power to regulate the time, place, and 
manner of speech and applies a “reasonableness” test to 
regulations that entirely abrogate certain First Amendment rights, 
such as the right of free citizens or inmates to select a particular 
means to communicate with one another. In any other context, 
such a significant abrogation of a constitutional right would be 
evaluated under the strict scrutiny standard. Nonetheless, modern 
courts reviewing a restriction that completely abrogates certain 
means of communication (such as written letters, phone calls, 
postcards, or emails) might evaluate such restrictions under the 
Turner reasonableness test when such sweeping regulations should 
be evaluated under a standard of strict, or at least heightened 
scrutiny. Otherwise, courts run the great risk that such regulations 
will unnecessarily violate constitutional rights. A standard of strict 
scrutiny is far more stringent than the Turner test, but it is not 
necessarily fatal to government regulations. Prisons would still be 
permitted to apply the least restrictive means available to achieve 
legitimate and compelling administrative interests. 
 
III. DOES FAILURE TO PROVIDE EMAIL IN PRISON IMPLICATE FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS? 
 
Although socially controversial, it is settled law that prison 
walls neither sever inmates from their constitutional rights nor “bar 
free citizens from exercising their own constitutional rights by 
reaching out to those on the inside.”56 As stated earlier, the 
threshold inquiry of any claim to free speech protections is whether 
or not the limitation at issue actually infringes on any free speech 
rights. 
In the context of inmate email access, it is helpful to recognize: 
                                                                                                             
56 Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 94–99; Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 
U.S. 119 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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(1) the cases that address access to other modern communication 
systems like telephones, (2) the lack of direct persuasive authority 
in the context of email, and (3) the fact that courts dealing with 
prisoner communications seem to have overlooked the right to 
choose a particular avenue of communication over another. 
 
A.  Comparing the Right to Telephone Use 
 
There is a strong similarity between the uses of telephonic and 
of electronic messaging in the context of prisons. Both involve an 
inmate’s access to a means of communication provided by modern 
technology and consequently implicate similar free speech 
considerations. But where email access for inmates is a novel 
issue, several circuit courts have directly addressed the assertion of 
telephone access as an inmate’s constitutional right. Therefore, 
cases involving inmate assertions of a right to telephone use 
provide a helpful comparison for determining whether or not the 
assertion of a right to email access would implicate protected free 
speech rights. Currently, there is a pronounced circuit split on the 
issue of whether or not inmates possess a constitutional right to 
telephone access. This split illustrates that the success of asserting 
rights to email may depend on the jurisdiction in which the claim is 
brought. 
The Ninth Circuit has held that “prisoners have a First 
Amendment right to telephone access,” though this right remains 
“subject to reasonable limitations arising from the legitimate 
penological and administrative interests of the prison system.”57 
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has held that prisoners have a First 
Amendment right to limited telephone access,58 while the Eighth 
Circuit has recognized that the First Amendment may include a 
right to prisoner telephone access.59 
Conversely, in Arsberry v. Illinois, the Seventh Circuit held 
that prisoners in Illinois have no First Amendment right to use the 
                                                                                                             
57 Johnson v. State of Cal., 207 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.1986)). 
58 Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir. 1994). 
59 Benzel v. Grammer, 869 F.2d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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telephone.60 Focusing solely on the general content of inmate 
communications, Judge Posner stated: 
Although the telephone can be used to convey 
communications that are protected by the First 
Amendment, that it is not its primary use and it is 
extremely rare for inmates and their callers to use 
the telephone for this purpose. Not to allow them 
access to a telephone might be questionable on 
other grounds, but to suppose that it would infringe 
the First Amendment would be doctrinaire in the 
extreme.61 
Although only in dictum, the First Circuit has agreed with the court 
in Arsberry, stating that inmates have “no per se constitutional 
right to use a telephone.”62 However, the First Circuit has also 
affirmed at least one district court order that required jail officials 
to provide inmates with access to telephones.63 
While claims asserting a right to email access may succeed in 
jurisdictions like the Ninth Circuit, where access to telephone use 
is considered a constitutional right, they seem highly unlikely to 
succeed in jurisdictions like the First and Seventh Circuit. 
 
B.  A Lack of Direct Persuasive Precedent 
 
The issue of whether inmates have a constitutional right to 
email access is a novel question. As of yet, it has only arisen in a 
few unpublished district court cases. These cases occurred in the 
Fourth Circuit,64 the Sixth Circuit,65 and the Tenth Circuit.66 In 
                                                                                                             
60 Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 564–65 (7th Cir. 2001). 
61 Id. 
62 United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145, 155 (1st Cir. 2000). 
63 Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 
1973), aff’d, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974). 
64 Grayson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 5:11cv2, 2012 WL 380426, at *3 
(N.D. W. Va. Feb. 6, 2012) (“[P]risoners have no First Amendment 
constitutional right to access email.”). 
65 Bristow v. Amber, No. 2:12-CV-412, 2012 WL 1963577, at *1 (S.D. 
Ohio May 31, 2012). 
66 Rueb v. Zavaras, No. 09–cv–02817, 2011 WL 839320, at *6 (D. Colo. 
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each instance the district court determined that “inmates have no 
established First Amendment right to access email.”67 
Although this narrow selection of cases rejects the notion that 
the First Amendment provides inmates with a right to email access, 
the reasoning behind each case suffers from a substantial deficit. In 
each case, the court based its decision on: (1) the lack of express 
authority establishing a constitutional right to email access, and (2) 
the precedent of one particular unpublished district court case from 
the Eighth Circuit, which stated that the government is not 
obligated to “provide telephones, videoconferencing, email, or any 
of the other marvelous forms of technology that allow 
instantaneous communication across geographical distances.”68 
First, as a novel issue, the lack of express authority establishing 
an inmate’s right to elect email access as an avenue of free speech 
does not suggest that such a right does not exist. Because inmates 
retain their constitutional rights during incarceration, limited only 
by the legitimate security concerns of the prison administration, 
precedent suggests that a complete limitation on the right to access 
a communicative avenue such as an email or phone service 
necessarily infringes upon the free speech interest of selecting the 
means of one’s communication. 
The second basis for these decisions is troubling, especially 
where a district court within the Eighth Circuit relied upon the 
limitations of the First Amendment to impose positive obligations 
on a prison rather than the rights protected by the First 
Amendment.69 Furthermore, if taken to mean that the First 
Amendment fails per se to protect inmate access to telephones, 
such a conclusion would directly contradict precedent from the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stating that limitations on 
telephone use may violate First Amendment protections.70 
 
                                                                                                             
Mar. 7, 2011). 
67 Id. 
68 Holloway v. Magness, No. 5:07CV00088 JLH-BD, 2011 WL 204891, at 
*7 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 21, 2011). 
69 Id. 
70 See Benzel v. Grammer, 869 F.2d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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C.  Inmate Email Access in the Context of the Right to Select an 
Avenue of Speech 
 
The conflicting guidance provided by cases dealing with phone 
or email use in prison focus narrowly on the right to send 
correspondence in and out of prison facilities. In doing so, they fail 
to account for the right to select a particular avenue or means of 
speech. It seems that a limitation that completely bars access to 
email systems would implicate First Amendment protections. Such 
a restriction would utterly eliminate an efficient, fundamental, and 
economically advantageous avenue of discourse. By eliminating 
the right to select email as a method of communication, prison 
officials do more than limit prisoners’ right to send and receive 
correspondence—they entirely abrogate their right to choose the 
means of their speech. 
 
IV. THE POSITIVE OBLIGATION HURDLE 
 
In its traditional sense, the First Amendment acts as a security 
of negative obligations, prohibiting government action (as opposed 
to inaction) that violates certain protections. The failure of state 
prison systems to provide inmates with email access is not the 
same as a regulation barring access to email services that are 
already in place. Accordingly, it would be difficult to enforce a 
right to email access if prisons and jails state that they simply 
cannot provide the resources to facilitate this particular form of 
communication. 
“[I]n those jurisdictions [such as the Ninth Circuit] where 
courts exercise constitutional review of state omissions and not 
only of state action, the guidelines for protecting social rights can 
be used to enforce the positive dimension of . . . freedom of 
expression.”71 Some district courts have applied this concept by 
ordering prison or jail officials to provide access to telephones in 
jurisdictions that have determined that inmates possess a First 
Amendment right to access them.72 Such orders imply that a 
                                                                                                             
71 Ivar A. Hartmann, A Right to Free Internet? On Internet Access and 
Social Rights, 13 J. High Tech. L. 297, 370 (2013). 
72 Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F. Supp. 1368, 1386 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (citing 
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positive obligation can exist to provide communication services 
where inmates have a constitutional right to access. However, 
other courts have determined that affirmative obligations on 
prisons are limited to the protections guaranteed by the Eighth 
Amendment, and that the First Amendment cannot give rise to 
such duties.73 
Accordingly, while the failure of state prison systems to 
provide inmates with email access is not the same as a regulation 
barring access to communication methods that are already in place, 
administrators might still have a duty to install email services or 
unlock certain features of an existing service where they are 
affordable or already installed in a limited form. In prisons where 
services have not yet been implemented, the inquiry becomes 
whether courts may impose an affirmative duty on prison systems 
to provide inmates with access to methods of communication. In 
prisons where a service is already installed but the administrators 
implement some features while not implementing others—such as 
allowing money deposits or incoming messages but not outgoing 
messages74—the question is whether such choices constitute 
“limiting” the features of those services. 
Whether or not the First Amendment can create positive 
obligations on a prison is a complicated issue worthy of thorough 
examination. This Article will not endeavor to take up that 
immense discussion. Suffice it to say that this is a controversial 
subject that is not resolved. While some jurisdictions have acted in 
                                                                                                             
Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F. Supp. 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Inmates of Suffolk 
Cnty. Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aff’d, 494 F.2d 1196 
(1st Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976); 
O’Bryan v. Cnty. of Saginaw, Mich., 437 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1977)). 
73 Holloway, 2011 WL 204891, at *7. 
74 For instance, in 2014, Nevada State Prison System had implemented JPay 
email services, but only allowed incoming messages. The state has since stopped 
implementing JPay systems all together, but still allows incoming emails to be 
sent to the prison where they are printed by prison staff and then delivered in 
paper format. Nevada Prisons Inmate, Family & Friends Share Page, Email from 
JPay, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/NevadaPrisons/posts/ 
784982748258964 (last visited Jan. 23, 2015); Inmate Email Information, STATE 
OF NEV. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, http://doc.nv.gov/Inmates/Inmate_Email 
_Information/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). 
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a manner suggesting that they may impose a positive obligation on 
prisons to provide access to a particular means of communication, 
others will refuse to recognize a positive dimension of First 
Amendment protections. 
 
V. EVALUATING THE LACK OF EMAIL ACCESS IN PRISON UNDER 
CURRENTLY EXISTING STANDARDS 
 
The “reasonableness test” of the Turner standard seemingly 
rejects the need to apply strict scrutiny to sweeping limitations or 
regulations that abrogate entire avenues of free speech, such as 
email. Nonetheless, despite the potential pitfalls of such an 
extremely deferential standard, courts evaluating the free speech 
rights of inmates will analyze government limitations under the 
existing framework for free speech rights in prison. As such, courts 
faced with demands for email access in prisons will look to the 
standard outlined in Turner for incoming message services and that 
of Martinez for outgoing messages. 
 
A.  Failure to Provide Email Under the Turner Standard 
 
Examining whether a regulation fails or passes the Turner 
standard requires assessing: (1) if the limitation is rationally related 
to a legitimate and neutral governmental objective; (2) if 
alternative avenues remain to exercise the asserted right; (3) the 
impact that accommodating the right will have on staff, prisoners, 
and prison resources; and (4) if easy and obvious alternatives 
indicate that prison practices are overly restrictive.75 
 
1. Restricting Email Use Has No Rational Relation to a 
Legitimate and Neutral Governmental Objective 
 
The first Turner factor requires that a court determine (1) if the 
governmental objective behind the policy is legitimate and neutral, 
and (2) if a rational relationship exists between the asserted 
                                                                                                             
75 Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). 
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objective and the policy regulation.76 If a regulation lacks a 
rational relationship to a legitimate objective under this first factor, 
then it cannot be reasonably related to the motive behind judicial 
deference to prison administrators, and “a court need not reach the 
remaining three factors.”77 
The burden of showing a rational relationship lies with prison 
systems, and is initially satisfied by presenting an “intuitive, 
common-sense connection” between the objective and the 
regulation.78 If challengers to prison practices show sufficient 
evidence refuting the connection, the prisons must additionally 
present enough evidence to show that the connection is not “so 
remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.”79 
Email in prisons has the power to drastically reduce the 
potential of prisoners receiving contraband through postal mail. 
Furthermore, prison email systems like TRULINCS have been 
shown to be financially self-sustaining and even contributory to the 
funding of other traditional means of communication and prison 
maintenance. Although prison email could lead to an increase in 
incoming correspondence, electronic messages are more readily 
screened for dangerous or prohibited content. Any displacement of 
incoming postage will likely result in an overall increase of prison 
mail efficiency. 
Perhaps more importantly on a social level, it has been 
recognized that such communication with family and friends 
“advances rather than retards the goal of rehabilitation.”80 It seems 
unlikely that the failure to provide email access could be 
considered rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. 
Although this factor is in itself not dispositive of the issue, it is of 
value to consider the remaining three Turner factors. 
 
                                                                                                             
76 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 (1989). 
77 Prison Legal News, 397 F.3d at 699; see also Walker v. Sumner, 917 
F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1990). 
78 Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 357 (9th Cir. 1999). 
79 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. 
80 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). 
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2. Alternative Avenues Exist to Exercise the Basic Right of 
Communicating, But May Not Offer Many of the Benefits That 
Might Lead an Inmate to Choose Email Over Postage 
 
In order for a prison or jail regulation that implicates free 
speech rights to be considered reasonable under the Turner 
standard, the inmate must retain some avenue of exercising his 
protected free speech. In evaluating this factor, “alternative means 
need not be ideal,”81 but instead “need only be available.”82 
Nonetheless, “the right in question must be viewed sensibly and 
expansively.”83 
Analysis of this factor depends largely on how the asserted 
right is framed. If the right infringed by email limitations is viewed 
as narrowly as the right to send or receive written communications, 
it is obvious that alternative avenues remain available for sending 
written correspondence, such as letters and postcards. Nonetheless, 
the nature of handwritten postage differs greatly from that of 
electronic messaging. Email is cost-effective, allows for rapid 
response from those in correspondence with each other, is 
protected from physical decay, and is recallable from multiple 
locations due to its stored electronic form. It might be said that 
these characteristics of email so differ from those of paper 
correspondence that the loss of these enhanced features implicates 
some other subtle right couched in free speech protection—the 
most likely being the right to choose the means of communicating 
in a form that retains similar protections offered by email services. 
If the right infringed upon by email limitations is viewed 
expansively as the right to select a particular means or avenue of 
communication, it would appear that absolutely no alternative 
avenue for exercising that right remains. 
 
3. The Impact on Staff, Prisoners, and Prison Resources is 
Minimal, if Not Beneficial 
 
Assessing the appropriateness of a speech restriction under the 
                                                                                                             
81 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003). 
82 Id. 
83 Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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Turner standard also requires examining the impact that 
accommodating the right will have on staff, prisoners, and prison 
resources.84 Because of the high likelihood that even the smallest 
changes will have some “ramification of the liberty of others or on 
the use of the prison’s resources,” this third factor weighs most 
heavily when “accommodation of an asserted right will have a 
significant ‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates and staff.”85 Also, “the 
policies followed at other well-run institutions [are] relevant to a 
determination of the need for a particular type of restriction.”86 
As stated in regards to the first Turner factor, the economic 
effects of email systems on prison resources are actually positive. 
It requires less manpower to monitor than physical mail, does not 
necessitate physical contact with mail, and can be reviewed by 
computer systems. Furthermore, such systems are self-financing. 
Looking to the policies of another well-run institution, the 
universal implementation of TRULINCS by the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons suggests that there is no need to arbitrarily restrict access 
to email communications. 
 
4. The Easy and Obvious Alternative of Implementing an Email 
Service Indicates That Prison Practices are Overly Restrictive 
 
Under the fourth Turner factor, courts consider whether easier 
and obvious alternatives exist for meeting the government’s 
interest in denying a privilege or implementing a regulation. If so, 
this would suggest that the prison practice might be overly 
restrictive. This factor should not be mistaken for a least restrictive 
alternative analysis. Under the Turner standard, prisons do not 
need to adopt the least restrictive alternative.87 However, courts 
may consider “an alternative that fully accommodates the 
[asserted] rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests” 
as evidence that the policy unreasonably infringes upon First 
                                                                                                             
84 Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). 
85 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. 
86 Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 2001). 
87 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–91. 
23
Johnson: Jail (E)Mail: Free Speech Implications of Granting Inmates Access
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2016
308 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 11:4 
Amendment rights.88 Under the fourth Turner factor, the 
availability of easily implemented services like JPay, considered 
together with the success of the TRULINCS program, suggest that 
denying email access is unnecessarily restrictive. 
The difficulty with this factor is determining what penological 
interests are actually advanced by restricting email 
communications. Fortunately, services like JPay have made 
installing email access in prisons a simple process. Perhaps, the 
theorized benefit to denying access to electronic communications 
is found in the simple reduction in the volume of communications 
that can enter and exit a prison. However, services like JPay can 
limit how many emails each inmate may send in a given time 
period. Additionally, any increase in the volume of 
communications might be offset by the added security benefits that 
accompany email services. Accordingly, the most reasonable 
alternative to prevent too high a volume of communications would 
be to limit the number of emails or letters allowed per day, but still 
provide access to email and postal services. 
 
B.  Failure to Provide Email Access Under the Martinez or 
Thornburgh Standard 
 
If a prison practice does not satisfy the more deferential test of 
the Turner standard, it will logically fail the scrutinizing Martinez 
standard as well. Nonetheless, some prison systems offer incoming 
email services to inmates, but do not allow outgoing emails. For 
instance, in 2014, the Nevada State Prison System was using JPay 
email services, but only allowed those functions that provided 
inmates with incoming messages.89 It should be noted that under 
the current framework for evaluating free speech rights in a prison 
context, prisons engaging in this practice should be subject to the 
more exacting scrutiny of Martinez. Once a prison implements 
email services such as JPay, and establishes that such services are 
available, limiting the service to incoming email should be 
permitted only if it furthers an important or substantial prison 
                                                                                                             
88 Id. at 91. 
89 See supra note 74. 
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interest and is no more restrictive than necessary to protect the 
particular interest involved.90 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Serious free speech concerns arise when prisons prevent 
inmates from accessing email services. This is true even under the 
currently accepted framework for assessing First Amendment 
claims of inmates, despite the extreme deference shown to prison 
administrators. Although actions eliminating an entire means of 
communication should be examined under a heightened level of 
scrutiny (prison setting or not), the more deferential Turner factors 
still suggest that preventing inmates from accessing email systems 
is unreasonable. Furthermore, the practice of implementing 
services such as JPay for incoming email services but not outgoing 
services should be evaluated under the even stricter standard of 
Martinez. 
In jurisdictions such as the Ninth Circuit, where courts have 
imposed positive obligations on prisons in a First Amendment 
context, the right to access communication systems such as 
telephones suggests that free speech protections could likewise be 
evolving towards inmates’ right to access email services. 
  
                                                                                                             
90 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled on other 
grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
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PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Remember that separate standards typically apply to 
ingoing and outgoing prison correspondence. 
 Keep in mind that the policy behind valid limitations on an 
inmate’s constitutional rights is couched in the need to 
promote prison security, not a degradation or reduction to 
the constitutional rights of inmates. 
 Although intermediate scrutiny typically applies to content-
neutral regulations on free speech, strict scrutiny might still 
apply where the government completely restricts a means 
or avenue of communication rather than its time, place, or 
manner. 
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